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The Impact of Brexit on the UK Economy 
By Dimitrios Syrrakos1 
 
Introduction 
The Brexit outcome of the UK’s EU Referendum on June the 23rd has led to heightened 
uncertainty in the UK economy, given the eventual structural changes it would entail and the 
considerable challenges to be faced in the process leading to its realisation. The structural 
changes will involve new trade relations and lower capital mobility with the remaining 27 EU 
member states. The hurdles in the process emanate primarily from the negotiations with the 
EU-27 concerning the new relations that will govern trade. The swift restoration of a new UK 
government in the summer of 2016 saw that economic uncertainty has, so far, be decoupled 
by political turmoil. That is not to say of course, that political turbulence should be ruled out, 
in the way leading to Brexit. The Chapter consists of four parts. The first, evaluates the 
implications of the PM’s Speech on the 17th of January and the EU responses it prompted. The 
second assesses the current UK-EU macroeconomic framework and changes to it brought 
about by the Referendum and the impeding Brexit negotiations. The third part draws on 
Brexit’s impact on SMEs from changes in the UK-EU27 trade relations. Finally, the fourth 
section focuses on the UK manufacturing sector and the strategies that could be adopted to 
mitigate the impact of Brexit, while seeking to take advantage of new opportunities.  
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1. PMs Speech - Implications and EU Responses 
 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 identified the conditions that EU countries should observe 
once they have joined the EU’s Single Market. These conditions are based on the principles 
of free movement of capital, goods, services and labour. By the second half of the 1990s, free 
movements of labour came to imply free movement of people.  
Trade relations between the UK and the rest of the EU, while the former remains an EU 
member, represent the optimal trade relations the UK can secure with other countries, in this 
case other EU members. The PM’s Speech on the 17th of January by ruling out continuation 
of Single Market membership implies that the outcome of the negotiations the UK 
government is about to embark with, with the rest of the EU cannot resemble the current 
trade relations. As a result, only a second or third best is attainable. In the words of 
Conservative MP and Chair of the Commons Education Committee Neil Carmichael: 
 
“The Prime Minister’s commitment to trading as freely as possible with the EU 
is welcome, but the best possible trading arrangement with the EU is full 
participation in the single market. No other arrangement is comparable, and so 
if the Government abandons membership of the single market, they will start 
the negotiations opting for second best.” (The Independent) 
 
The UK’s macroeconomic arrangements and trade relations with other EU countries are 
depicted in Table-1 below. Exchange rate arrangements are presented horizontally at the top 
and trade relations are depicted vertically on the left. Brexit, with curbing immigration 
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implications, as reinforced by the PM Speech will inevitably place the UK under different (less 
advanced) trade arrangements with all remaining EU-27 countries. This second best scenario, 
a variation of ‘hard-Brexit’, will see the UK’s trade relations with the rest of the EU 
downgraded to retaining access to (a much needed) Customs Union.  
Table-1 
EU Trade Relations and Exchange Rate Arrangements 
 
 
The PM’s Speech despite demarcating the UK’s negotiating framework, based on the 12 
objectives provided, it did not explicitly clarify the type of trade relations it seeks to establish 
with the EU in the post-Brexit environment. For example, objectives 8 and 9 are inherently 
inconsistent. Objective-8, called for the UK seeking a ‘Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
             EUROPEAN UNION MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
         CURRENY - EXCHANGE RATE RELATIONS
TRADE RELATIONS Flexible Fixed Common
Exch. Rates Exchange Rates Currency - Euro
World Trade Organis.
Cliff-Edge
Free Trade Area
Common Internal Very Hard
Tariffs and Quotas  Brexit
Customs Union
Common Internal Turkey ?
 and External Hard Brexit 
Tariffs and Quotas
Single Market Soft Brexit - Poland, France, Germany
Common Internal accessing Sinlge Denmark Italy, Spain, Lux.,
and External Tarrifs Market Sweden Austria, Ireland
and Quotas Bulgaria Belgium, Portugal 
PLUS       UK Romania Finland, Cyprus
Coordination of  Hungary Holland, Greece
Macroecon. Policies Slovakia, Slovenia
and/or reduction of  Lihtuania, Latvia, 
Exchange rate volatility Estonia, Malta.
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with the European Union’.  At the same time though, the PM recognised that: ‘But I want to 
be clear. What I am proposing cannot mean membership of the Single Market’. The PM then 
went on to say:  
 
‘That Agreement may take in elements of current Single Market arrangements 
in certain areas – on the export of cars and lorries for example, or the freedom 
to provide financial services across national borders – as it makes no sense to 
start again from scratch when Britain and the remaining Member States have 
adhered to the same rules for so many years. So an important part of the new 
strategic partnership we seek with the EU will be the pursuit of the greatest 
possible access to the Single Market, on a fully reciprocal basis, through a 
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. ’ [Italics provided].  
 
The UK government’s stance causes confusion and often dismay to EU officials. If an EU 
country acknowledges that curbing immigration implies no Single market membership, then 
that country cannot have access to the specific Single Market’s elements in certain areas of 
interest. Preferential access (access a la carte) cannot be granted. This is the case, not because 
the EU wants to punish the UK, but because it would undermine that functioning of the Single 
Market itself. If the UK is able to export cars to EU’s Single Market (e.g. to France and 
Germany), without paying its contributions to EU, why should not other EU countries have 
the same deal, while losing market share to the UK automobile industry? As a consequence, 
there cannot be the greatest possible access, (or any access) to the Single Market. Effectively 
this means that the nature of Brexit is going to be hard.  
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However, regardless of the clarity provided concerning the UK’s negotiating stance, in terms 
of not seeking continuation of Single Market membership, further confusion was caused in 
relation to Customs Union Membership. In setting objective-9 on new trade agreements with 
other countries, the PM acknowledged: 
 
‘I know my emphasis on striking trade agreements with countries outside 
Europe has led to questions about whether Britain seeks to remain a member of 
the EU's Customs Union. And it is true that full Customs Union membership 
prevents us from negotiating our own comprehensive trade deals. […] Whether 
that means we must reach a completely new customs agreement, become an 
associate member of the Customs Union in some way, or remain a signatory to 
some elements of it, I hold no preconceived position. I have an open mind on 
how we do it. It is not the means that matter, but the ends.’ 
 
As full membership of a Customs Union precludes establishing free trade areas independently 
with third parties, it can only be concluded that the UK is contemplating leaving the EU’s 
Customs Union. To understand why this is the case consider the following scenario, which is 
highly likely to emerge if objectives 8 and 9 as set out by the PM were implemented. Assume 
the UK, following Brexit, is granted full access to the EU’s Customs Union, and at the same 
time exceptionally permitted to join trade agreements with other countries. Soon after, the 
UK and the USA could create their own Customs Union. This implies that the UK would be 
party to two separate Customs Unions, and as a result, imported products from the USA could 
flood the EU Customs Union via the UK.  
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This would clearly undermine the functioning of the EU’s Customs Union and would not be 
viable. Eventually, the UK would either be requested to apply the EU’s external tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers to USA goods and services (effectively dissolving its Customs Union with 
the USA), or leave the EU’s Customs Union. This example, illustrates why not a single country 
is party to two Customs Unions. Going back to the example, the only way for this to be the 
case, is for all other EU countries to accept the terms and conditions of the USA-UK Customs 
Union. This would then imply that the two customs unions have merged to one Customs 
Union including the EU-UK-USA.     
This rules out the PM’s proposal for a new customs agreement, as any agreement would have 
to be inferior to the EU’s Customs Union. However, it does not rule out, limited or preferential 
access. Assuming good will from the part of the EU, limited access to the EU’s Customs Union 
could form the basis for an agreement. And this is exactly what the PM offered and clarified 
on her Speech. The crucial issue therefore, the negotiations would focus on is what markets 
such an agreement would include. Ultimately, compromises would have to be made from the 
UK’ negotiating team, in particular concerning financial services. To conclude, the PM’s 
speech provided clarity by recognising that soft Brexit is no longer an option (ruling out the 
small arrow on the left hand side in table-1, and moving to somewhere between the two 
middle arrows). This would point to an agreement that falls short of full access to EU’s 
Customs Union but it is much superior to a free trade area. This is relatively encouraging as it 
conveys the message to the EU that the UK is ready to negotiate on the grounds of an inferior 
variant of the EU’s Customs Union agreement. By doing so, the PM Speech shifted the debate 
away from ‘soft vs hard’ Brexit, to one over ‘hard vs very hard’ Brexit, while pointing its 
preference for a consensus closer to the former.     
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Notwithstanding the difficulties in making a prediction for the final agreement the framework 
set by the PM indicates that it could resemble in some ways the EU-Turkey customs union 
subject to differences in the sectors it would include. 
It needs to be noted though, that the Common Market guidelines regulate only around 40% 
of the EU member countries economic activity with areas such as financial services and 
insurance largely not included. Hence, the UK’s government proposals for, in effect a ‘sector-
by-sector’ access to the Single Market. Such an approach would make sense, provided the 
European Commission (EC) allows individual EU countries to negotiate bilateral trade 
agreements with the UK on specific sectors, such as insurance. However, given that the EC’s 
objective is to enlarge the Single Market competency areas and to include as many industries 
as possible, this is highly unlikely (Morales, 2017). As Chancellor Merkel pointed out in 
response to the PM’s Speech: ‘The main thing is that Europe does not let itself be divided and 
we will make sure of that via very intensive dialogue’.  A consensus similar to the Switzerland-
EU’s trade agreement should not be ruled out, ensuring access to specific Single Market areas. 
This of course would involve a compromise from the UK government as it would limit its ability 
to reduce immigration from the EU and it would also have to continue making contributions 
to the EU.  
Failure to secure access to the Single Market and the Customs Union will lead the UK’s trade 
relations with the rest of the EU to a free trade area, or a ‘very hard’ Brexit. Failure to agree 
even on a free trade area between the UK and the EU’s free trade area, will relegate the UK’s 
trade relations to World Trade Organisation (WTO) regulations that broadly allow free trade 
but subject to countries’ unilateral tariffs and quotas.  
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Much desired flexibility from the rest of the EU countries and the European Commission could 
facilitate an agreement, based on a version of the EU’s Customs Union, permitting some 
curbing in immigration. However, as a Customs Union implies the adoption of common 
external tariffs and quotas it would be impossible to forge trade relations with other parts of 
the world, such as the USA, China, India and Australia.  
Early signs from European Union officials are not encouraging. Guy Verhofstadt, the EU 
Parliament’s representative in the negotiations (and former Belgian PM), summed up the 
PM’s 12 objectives the day after the PM delivered her Speech, as ‘creating an illusion that you 
can go out of the single market and the customs union and you can cherry pick and still have 
a number of advantages [ … ]. He went on to add ‘I think this will not happen. We shall never 
accept a situation in which it is better to be outside the single market than be a member of 
the European Union’ (Khan, 2017). While visiting Washington, on the 26th of January, Mr 
Verhofstadt also stated that ‘The UK PM announced a very radical Brexit because she knows 
that the EU will never accept a situation in which the status of a country outside the union is 
more favourable than to be a member of the European Union’ (Wishart, 2017). On the 
prospects of a new trade deal between the UK and the EU-27 to be delivered by 2019, pledged 
by the PM, Mr. Verhofstadt called it ‘impossible’.  
Sir Andrew Cahn, former Single Market advisor to the UK government and one of the 
architects of the EU’s Single Market foresees a ‘bitter’ divorce. He also points out that ‘The 
EU side, after all, in a way, have already won the first round of this negotiation because they 
have forced the UK to say ‘no, we won’t be in the single market’ (Merrick, 2017). 
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The volumes of trade involved are vital. The UK exported to the EU approximately £230 bn in 
2015, which is equal to 47% of the £490 bn of total UK exports (CBI, 2016). The rest of the EU 
exported £290 billion to the UK (thus leaving a UK deficit to the rest of the EU by £60 bn).  
Let’s us assume that Brexit negotiations and a final ‘hard Brexit’ agreement lead to a 20% 
reduction in the intra EU-UK volumes of trade. A 20% reduction in the UK exports to EU, will 
lead to a decrease by £46 bn from £230 to £184 bn. However, more importantly it would also 
reduce total UK exports from £490 bn to (490 – 46) = £ 444 bn, or 9.4% of total UK exports. 
On the other hand, a 20% reduction in the EU exports to the UK will see them reduced by 
£58bn to from £290 bn to £232 bn. This would also reduce total EU exports from £1.812tn to 
£1.754 tn, or 3.2% of total EU exports.  
As a result, while hard-Brexit will prove detrimental for both the UK and the EU, it would 
approximately be three time costlier for the UK in terms of net exports. The same result is 
derived when comparing the intra EU-UK volumes of exports relative to their respective GDP. 
UK exports to EU equal 12% of the UK’s GDP, whereas EU exports to the UK equals 3.5% of 
the EU’s GDP (excluding the UK). Reflecting on the same issue, Ulrich Hoppe, the head of the 
German-British Chamber of Industry and Commerce, claimed that:  
 
‘Germany’s trade surplus with the U.K. amounts to about 1 percent of the gross 
domestic product of Europe’s biggest economy, and if 1 percent of German GDP 
grows slightly less or slightly more, it doesn’t really matter to the German 
economy. So the idea that Germany from a business point of view will be very 
flexible towards the U.K. in the Brexit negotiations is a dream.’ (Italics provided). 
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The other side of this argument of course, is that the loss in net exports to the EU, will 
be more than compensated by the devaluation of the Pound, which will boost the 
export orders and thus the quantity of exports. Thus, while profit margins may be 
reduced per unit of exports due to potential tariffs, increased sales could generate 
more profits on aggregate. This maybe the case for as long as the UK remains in the 
Single Market. Post-Brexit it would depend on the nature of the tariffs and the extent 
of the pound’s depreciation, the combined impact of which is almost impossible to 
anticipate. The exchange rate dimension to the argument is addressed in the following 
section.  
 
2. The UK - EU Macroeconomic Framework 
Exchange rate arrangements  
The European Commission (EC) perceives exchange rate volatility as a barrier to trade. Its 
elimination is therefore conducive to the completion of the Single Market. Countries in the 
Eurozone (EZ) for example have chosen the most advanced type of a fixed exchange rate 
regime that of a currency union and have thus contributed to this aim. The UK on the other 
hand, while accepts the need for exchange rate stability, in this case in the Pound-to-Euro 
exchange rate it has maintain its monetary independence. This means that the Bank of 
England (BE) has retained the right to set the ‘base rate’ and target the Money Supply (MS) in 
line with the needs of the UK economy. This right was exercised soon after the Great 
Recession hit the UK economy. From spring 2009 -when the BE was convinced of the severity 
of the recession- to autumn 2012, the BE pursued unconventional monetary policies involving 
lowering the rate of interest to unprecedented levels, and adopting a Quantitative Easing (QE) 
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programme that led to the injection of extra £375 bn pounds in the UK financial institutions 
in four rounds.  
This helped UK financial institutions to increase their capital and reserve requirements, 
however, it did not lead to increases in lending in the short run. As confidence to the UK was 
shattered, following the deficit’s increase to 10.5% in 2009-10, the new coalition government 
adopted a fiscal consolidation programme to accompany BE’s expansionary monetary policy. 
The initial objective was deficit elimination by 2015, when the next national election was due 
to take place. The policy framework of contractionary fiscal and expansionary monetary policy 
was considered the most appropriate by the UK coalition government.  
However, the private sector’s response to expansionary monetary policy was not the one 
anticipated. Banks and private sector companies hoarded money, instead of investing, given 
the prospects of another recession in 2012. Eventually, as the deficit was gradually reduced, 
albeit not to the extent initially projected, confidence was gradually restored leading the UK 
economy becoming the fastest growing among the G7 during 2014-15. External 
developments, such as the Eurozone’s debt crisis peak in 2011-12, saw the UK’s safe haven 
status been restored. However, it has to be noted, that the positive developments in the UK 
economy, were taking place, in the background of unconventional monetary policy and 
productivity not recovering its 2008 rates. As in the long-run, it is productivity rates that 
determine whether countries become wealthier or poorer, a lot more work was/is required 
to take place in terms of infrastructure investment, education, R&D etc. (Cadman, 2016). 
Overall though, the QE programme’s effectiveness and the pound’s depreciation in 2008 
reaching 30% against the USA dollar and the Euro, are evaluated as having a relatively positive 
effect on the UK economy at a time of considerable hardship. Gradually, after seven long 
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years, towards the end of 2014 and 2015 the focus shifted away from unconventional policies, 
to forming expectations of when the BE will start raising the base rate towards more ‘normal’ 
rates. Overall, according to BE’s estimations the QE programme, added 1 percent growth 
annually between 2010 and 2015.              
However, the BEs QE programme, while helpful to the UK economy, had wider implications 
in the EU context. It placed the UK in a unique position. In order to understand why this is the 
case, we need to resort to exchange rate definitions.  
At a basic level the exchange rate is the rate at which a currency e.g. the domestic currency 
(£) translates-converts to another currency (e.g. £1 = 1.15 Euros). This is the bilateral 
exchange rate, that is the units of another currency that 1 Pound can buy. Another definition 
is based on the real effective exchange rate. This is based on a weighted average of the 
exchange rates of the most important trading partners of the country under perspective. As 
a result, the real effective exchange rate provides an objective way of judging the relative 
strength of the domestic currency against a basket of other currencies. For example, by 
focusing only on a particular bilateral exchange rate, e.g. the Pound to South African Rand, it 
is very difficult to assess the overall impact of the Brexit vote on the Pound’s performance. 
This is particularly the case, when contrasting trends are observed in bilateral exchange rates. 
For example, the value of the pound has declined significantly in relation to the Euro since 
June but has remained relative stable in relation to the Russian Ruble. Thus, it becomes very 
difficult to pass judgements on the overall performance of a currency by drawing on specific 
bilateral exchange rates. The real effective exchange rate resolves this problem, but focusing 
on the trends of the bilateral rates of the currencies of the 24 (or 26) most important trading 
partners. In this way, the effects of an ‘outlier’ bilateral exchange rate trend are minimized.  
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The real effective exchange rate raises the question over the definition of the real 
exchange rate. The Real Exchange Rate (RER) equals the bilateral-(nominal) exchange rate 
multiplied by the ratio of the price of exports over the price of imports.  
Real ER = Nominal ER x 
ports
Exports
P
P
Im
   (1) 
In a fixed exchange rate regime, the bilateral-nominal exchange rate is irrevocably fixed 
and any adjustment to economic shocks has to come by the price ratio of exports over 
imports.                                         Fixed Exchange Rates   
Real ER = Nominal ER x 
ports
Exports
P
P
Im
    
This reflects the need for the domestic economy to become competitive in the short 
run, by reducing the cost of production in the productive sectors of the economy, such as 
export industries. This reduces export prices, and as such, the export-to-import price ratio will 
decline, causing an overall reduction in the RER. This mechanism provides the main 
theoretical rationale in favour of fiscal cuts in Southern Eurozone. Overall, the nominal 
exchange rate (which is fixed and cannot be adjusted) will be multiplied by a lower export-to 
-import price ratio and it will lead to a depreciation in the RER, stimulating further the volume 
of exports.  
Fixed Exchange Rates adjustment via                 Flexible Exchange Rates adjustment via 
 
   Real ER = Nominal ER x 
ports
Exports
P
P
Im
                             Real ER = Nominal ER x  
ports
Exports
P
P
Im
   
On the other hand, under flexible exchange rates, the adjustment to economic shocks 
in the short run, is delivered from the depreciation in the nominal exchange rate, without 
requiring an immediate adjustment to the exports-to-imports price ratio. The depreciation 
14 
 
(or devaluation), reduces the nominal exchange rate thus causing a decline to nominal ER x 
export-to-import prices. Overall, the RER declines, facilitating the restoration in 
competitiveness caused by the shock. As a result, the adjustment of the UK economy to the 
Brexit outcome of the EU Referendum in June is facilitated by the significant depreciation in 
the nominal exchange rate of the Pound. This has already boosted orders for domestically 
produced goods and services from the rest of the EU and the US in particular. This is 
particularly the case for the UK manufacturing sector.  
The above analysis does not imply that the exports-to-imports price ratio would not 
adjust in the medium-to-long run even under flexible exchange rates. The crucial issue is that 
this adjustment does not need to take place immediately, so that flexible exchange rates 
provide more time to the domestic economy to adjust to the newly emerged environment. 
This provides one of the main advantages of flexible exchange rates.   
The above discussion on the adjustment mechanisms under fixed and flexible exchange 
rates respectively, leads to the question of what drives the (nominal) price of a currency to 
decline. In order to account for this, the determinants of the exchange rate need to be 
presented.  The main determinants of the value of the domestic currency include:  
i) the volumes and composition of trade (Balance of Payments); 
ii) the rate of interest in relation to the rates of interest in other major economies; 
iii) the domestic price level;  
iv) growth performance;  
v) economic fundamentals. 
Increased volumes and favourable terms of trade, that is exports exceeding imports, will lead 
to surpluses in the UK’s balance of payments placing upward pressure on the value of the 
pound. On the other hand, persistent decreases in the volume of exports accompanied by 
increases in imports, would lead to deficits in the UK’s balance of payments putting downward 
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pressure on the value of the Pound. The rate of interest is the main short-term determinant 
of the value of the domestic currency. An increase in the BE’s interest rate (base discount 
rate) would lead to an increase in the value of the pound, in the absence of interest rate 
changes abroad. Likewise, a decrease in the base rate, would lead to a depreciation. Higher 
inflation than abroad leads to a depreciation in the value of the Pound in the long-run. In the 
short-run however, it can prompt an appreciation if it leads domestic residents to expect an 
increase in the base rate, to counter inflationary pressures.  
Lastly, a deterioration in the domestic economy’s fundamentals would lead to a depreciation. 
Economic fundamentals, include industrial production, cost of production per unit of output, 
technological innovation and adaptation to production among others.  
The determinants of the exchange rate should not be viewed in isolation. Assume for 
example, that there is persistently higher inflation in the UK than in France. This imply that 
year-on-year producing the same product in the UK would gradually become more expensive 
than producing it in France. As a result, sales of the product made in France will increase in 
international markets, at the expense of the sales of the UK product. This would have a 
negative impact on the volumes of UK exports, and therefore on the terms of trade, in 
particular the current account of the balance of payments. It would also have a negative 
impact on the UK growth potential. This would cause the value of the pound to depreciate.  
Likewise, when the Bank of England supplies more pounds to the economy, the Pound’s value 
would decrease, causing a reduction in the cost of production in the UK in international terms, 
in the short run. In the medium to the long run, import push inflation will pass through the 
production process and the UK’s competitive advantages emanating from the devaluation 
would be reduced if not eliminated (Meakin, 2017). There are the kind of inflationary 
processes the UK economy is currently experiencing (ONS, 2017).  
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To summarize, the supply of money therefore presumes a free-floating exchange rate and 
independent monetary authorities. Countries, that chose to join a fixed exchange rate regime 
and replace their currencies with a common currency (e.g. France, Germany, Italy etc.), 
surrender monetary independence in the sense that they cannot increase the money supply 
for domestic policy objectives. Reducing exchange rate volatility, which can be facilitated by 
joining a fixed exchange rate regime with another country’s currency, would be conducive to 
enhancing the volumes of trade between the two countries in the regime (e.g. France and 
Germany).  
The only EU country that has retained full monetary independence is the UK. The UK economy 
as a result functions within a macroeconomic framework featuring, free movements of 
capital, labour movements, free trade (including free movements of goods and services) and 
flexible exchange rates. The Eurozone member countries’ economies on the other hand, are 
in an environment of irrevocably fixed exchange rates (EZ), free capital and labour 
movements and free trade. These arrangements place the BE in a unique position within the 
EU framework. It has the right to engage in expansionary monetary policy without consent of 
other EU countries to mitigate the negative impact of recessions, like the Great Recession 
during 2008-09 and the Brexit shock in 2016. The schematics of the UK positioning in the EU 
context is presented below. As it can be observed the UK’s current arrangements in the EU 
lead to Pound-to-Euro exchange rate volatility.    
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 United Kingdom                                                       Euro Area + Denmark, Sweden etc. 
                                Free movement of Goods, Services                                     
                                               Capital and LABOUR 
Monetary Autonomy;                                                           Fixed Exchange Rates; 
 
Value of the Pound (£/€ exchange rate volatility) 
 
Such volatility has been observed since 2008. During 2014-15 the Pound appreciated 
considerably, leading to a Pound-to-Euro exchange rate of 1.42 and to a Pound-to-Dollar 
exchange rate of 1.45 in December 2015. The significant appreciation in the value of the 
Pound during this period, reflected the gradual restoration of confidence in the UK economy, 
prompted partly by the halving of the 2010 deficit, and partly due to the growth performance 
of the UK economy, which as mentioned registered the highest growth among G7. On the 
other hand, this favourable macroeconomic environment took place on the background of 
low productivity and unbalanced growth, both in terms of its drivers and regional 
performance (Smith, 2017). Growth was driven primarily by services and less so by 
construction and exports and was heavily focused on the South with many regions around 
the country, not recovering their 2008 output loses.  
This trend has persisted well into 2016, as the latest preliminary growth figures for Q4 2016, 
while confirming the UK’s strong growth momentum (0.6% in Qs 2-3-4 and 2% for 2016) also 
reflect its unbalanced nature, as its major driver was services (ONS, 2017b). Other major 
international organisations have also confirmed this trend and their short-term forecasts 
point to a slowdown in growth while Brexit negotiations are under way. The International 
18 
 
Monetary Fund projects a growth of 1.1% for 2017, a rate echoed by the World Bank that 
expects growth of 1.2% for the current year, and 1.3% in 2018. The Bank of England, slightly 
more optimistic anticipates growth to slow to 1.4% in 2017 and 1.5% in 2018. The Office for 
Budget Responsibility, forecasted a growth rate of 1.4% for 2017 and 1.7% for 2018.There is 
consensus for the reasons for the slowdown in growth including Brexit negotiations, and its 
unbalanced nature (Cox-2017b).  
 
BE’s 2% inflation target – The Pound 
The Bank of England adhere to the principle of flexible inflation targeting. While inflation in 
the UK has been maintained below the 2% inflation target since 2013, the Pound’s drop since 
July 2016 has caused import prices to increase in £ terms. As import-push inflation passes 
through into the UK production process, via e.g. higher food prices, eventually this will 
lead/has led to higher inflation in the UK. The BE in its August report, produced a forecast for 
a rate of inflation of 2.7% in 2017. BE Governor Mark Carney and the Bank’s Monetary Policy 
Committee have already communicated that they will not increase the base rate, in the case 
of a one-off violation of the 2% inflation target provided it is maintained at reasonable levels. 
However, the forecast assumed no further depreciation in the value of the pound. Major 
financial institutions such as HSBC and Deutsche Bank, Germany’s Central Bank, expect the 
pound to further, depreciate another 5 and 10% respectively, reaching a low of $1.10. This 
was attributed first to political uncertainty and second to the UK’s wide external imbalances 
that persists, at least so far, despite the devaluation that took place in the aftermath of the 
Referendum (Spezzati, 2017). 
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Overall, in the medium to long run the Pound’s depreciation will lead to a re-allocation of 
resources from SME’s (and sectors of the economy) that are exposed to the increase in 
import-push inflation to SMEs (and sectors of the economy) that are not. Assume an SME 
firm, SME-A, is less exposed to import-push inflation and not dependent on the influx of less 
skilled labour from EU countries. It would, eventually, be in a competitive advantage in 
relation to another SME, SME-B that is exposed to import-push inflation and is dependent on 
less skilled labour from East EU countries. If SME-A’s main export market is the USA, whereas 
SME-B’s main export market is France or Germany the competitive advantage would widen 
even further. It could also be the case that SME-A is not an export-orientated company but 
entirely dependent on developments in the UK economy (e.g. a construction firm). The extent 
of the resource re-allocation away from SME-B to SME-A would be dependent on the final 
Brexit agreement.          
Following the Brexit outcome delivered in the EU Referendum the Pound dropped 
significantly in particular in relation to the US dollar and the Euro. The decline has been more 
significant against the dollar to levels not seen since the mid-1980s. In relation to the Euro, 
the pound has dropped back to its 2011 level. To date the depreciation has reached 20% in 
against the dollar and 13% against the Euro from its January 2016 value.  
 
Pound-to-Dollar 
One of the interesting features of the exchange rate volatility in the value of the Pound, post-
Referendum has been its dramatic decline in relation to the USA dollar. What has prompted 
this decline? There are three main reasons.  
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First, it is the outcome of the Referendum, which caused/s uncertainty in foreign exchange 
markets leading to a decline in most of the Pound’s bilateral exchange rates, and as a result, 
a decline in the Pound’s Real Exchange Rate. However, this reason alone cannot account for 
the magnitude of decline in relation to the $US. A second reason, relates to the UK’s record 
current account deficit in in 2015 that reached an overall 5.2% (Albanese, et al. 2017). From 
a purely economic perspective, this reflects that the appreciation of the Pound during 2014 
and 2015 was not sustainable. Even this, though does not suffice to fully explain the Pound’s 
depreciation against the dollar, in excess of its decline against other currencies.  
Why for example the Pound has receded to its 2011-12 value against the Euro whereas has 
dropped to levels not seen since the 1980s against the dollar? At this point, emphasis needs 
to be placed on events in the USA. The growth potential in the US economy has gathered 
enough pace to prompt the Fed to increase rates for the first time in 2016. While there are 
still underlying problems in the USA economy, (e.g. labour market participation rate in the 
USA is 63-64% against the UK’s rate of 74.5%), developments point to monetary policy 
divergence between the USA and the UK. The August decision by the BE to reduce the base 
rate to 0.25% conveyed a signal to markets that the adjustment of the UK economy to Brexit 
environment would take priority for the BE over short term considerations with the rate of 
inflation. The Governor of the BE has also acknowledged that a one-off inflation overshooting 
above the 2% target will be tolerated by the Bank in the short to the medium run, in particular 
as Brexit negotiations are taking place.  
Assuming therefore that BE’s inflation forecast for a 2.7% inflation in 2017 proves correct this 
will strengthen market’s perception of a monetary policy divergence between the UK and the 
USA in the short to the medium run. This prognosis is of course in line with the Chancellor’s 
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extension of deficit elimination period, which has been pushed beyond 2020, as emphasis is 
placed on the adjustment of the economy to the Brexit challenges.  
Lastly, as ‘Trumpenomics’ raises the prospect for an even stronger USA growth performance, 
this reinforces market’s expectations pointing to further interest rate hikes in the USA during 
2017 and 2018. Thus, divergence in the USA and UK monetary policy, could lead to higher 
interest rate differential between the two countries, could precipitate capital inflows to the 
USA. This, combined with the above two reasons explains the sharp depreciation of the Pound 
in relation to the USA dollar.  
As mentioned above, the forecast for a 2.7% inflation in the UK is based on the assumption 
that the value of the Pound will be maintained at its current levels. Given the markets’ focus 
on the politics of Brexit, a further depreciation in the value of the pound cannot be ruled out 
(Albanese, 2017). The Pound-to-Dollar exchange rate will be crucial to companies exporting 
to the USA, as it would (has) boosted orders for UK goods and services. Given that the UK is 
about to embark on a process that will see it departing from the EU, relations in broad terms, 
but also trade relations in particular with the USA will be vital. This is the case, as the USA will 
provide an obvious candidate country that the UK should seek to enhance its trade ties with. 
A prospect, which already seems to be reciprocal from the new USA administration (Editorial, 
2017). There are obvious obstacles that could hinder this process, such as the obvious delays 
in reaching a new trade agreement. However, given the political willingness in the USA, 
increases in the UK-USA volumes of trade should be targeted (Ross-Thomas, 2017).  
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3. Small and Medium Enterprises 
 
In terms of timely and adequate preparations for a smooth adjustment to a Brexit 
environment SMEs must assess, if not already identified, their exposure to Brexit 
negotiations. SMEs focusing primarily on domestic markets, such as construction companies, 
are by definition not dependent on sales to EU markets, are very well placed to adjust to the 
Brexit environment. The long-run threat to SMEs in this category, relates to the deterioration 
on the purchasing power of the UK households and increases in the price of oil. The higher 
the inflationary overshooting from the BE’s 2% inflation target and the longer its duration 
beyond 2017, the more the purchasing power is going to be reduced (Ward, 2017a, 2017b). 
In this case, in the long-run SMEs in this category will suffer from the decline in households’ 
real wages, which would sooner or, later translate to less spending. In the short-to-medium 
run, spending may be sustained as households’ are prepared to take on more credit, or 
withdraw from savings to maintain their current standards of living. However, as credit 
accelerates, credit constraints will manifest themselves leading to less spending. Given the 
discussion above concerning the depreciation in the pound, SMEs in this category, should also 
develop contingency plans for rates of inflation reaching or exceeding the 5% threshold. 
Indeed, the substantial drop in retail sales in December 2016, at the fastest pace since 2012, 
enhances the legitimacy of the argument (Goodman, 2017).     
SMEs that are not dependent on exporting to EU could still experience difficulties emanating 
from labour shortages, in particular of less skilled labour. This, apart from driving higher 
labour costs, as firms would compete for labour from a relatively fixed labour market could 
also hurt overall production. In this case, access to EU labour market could be rendered 
possible, depending on the final Brexit agreement, and assuming that the brunt of the cost of 
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a job permits scheme, would be met by the UK government. This is an area that would require 
lobbying from SMEs. In the long-run, due to the potentially higher costs of accessing funds 
and financial services SMEs need to put aside funds to support these services once Brexit 
materialises. This is particularly the case, if there is no interim agreement in place following 
the two years’ negotiation period, as stipulated by Article-50. 
SMEs that have trade links with the USA should seek the UK government’s assistance in terms 
of further enhancing them. From their part, such SMEs should seize this unique opportunity 
and start develop immediate plans, detailing steps that would facilitate such an 
enhancement. SMEs with limited access to USA markets or that do not have ties with USA 
should identify whether these are possible to establish. In this case, they should prepare draft 
feasibility strategies on whether trade ties with the USA can be developed. In case these 
strategies have the potential to be fruitful, they should seek grants (research grants, transport 
costs coverage, etc.) from the UK (and perhaps the USA) government as they seek USA 
markets. This can be the case in particular for SMEs that have strong existing ties with EU 
countries and as a result of Brexit, aim to diversify their markets. Minimising losses in the 
Single Market, subject to Brexit negotiations, and maximising sales to the USA is the obvious 
long run objective.      
SMEs depending on the Single Market will be affected more severely. In the short-run though 
(2017-19), they should take advantage of the Pound’s drop and maximise sales (and profits) 
before import push inflation erodes their price advantage from other competitors located in 
other EU countries, and in particular in the Eurozone, and before the current trade 
arrangements seize to exist. In this perspective, it is in the interest of these SMEs, if some 
access to the Customs Union is maintained. As, following the PM’s Speech full access to the 
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Single Market is highly improbable, access to EU’s Customs Union could provide a viable way 
forward for a large number of SMEs that would face obstacles while trying to reach EU 
markets, but could mitigate these by the competitive advantage provided by the pound’s 
drop. As a result, joining the existing EU’s Customs union arrangements after 2019, in the 
absence of a Brexit agreement is vital. A (hard) Brexit agreement could provide access to UK 
goods and services in the EU Customs Union. However, contingency plans for a very hard 
Brexit should be in place, by the end of 2019 at the latest. These, should include plans for 
mitigating accelerating inflation to levels of 4.5 - 5.5%.             
Finally, in this context, it becomes vital for all SMEs to avoid a ‘cliff-edge’, where following an 
unsuccessful two-year period of negotiations access to Single market is lost, and there are no 
trade agreements with other countries (USA, India and EU). It is of paramount importance 
therefore all SMEs lobby the UK government and its negotiating team in particular for such a 
catastrophic scenario to be prevented. Contingency plans for a ‘cliff-edge’ should be prepared 
as early as possible, but they should not be viewed as the central scenario, for the present. 
They would amount to WTO rules and regulations for the UK exports for the EU markets and 
non-EU markets.             
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Table-2: Summary of SMEs Response 
               Small and Medium Enterprises     
         
Not exposed to 
EU markets  Short-run: Identify the impact of declines in the purchasing power  
                     of UK households, following inflationary pressures   
  Medium-run: Identify shortages in less skilled labour.    
  Long-run: Contingency plans for higher cost of financial services and 
                     inflation ranging from 4.5 - 5.5% - Lobby to avoid 'cliff-edge' 
         
         
Exporting to EU Short-run: Maximise benefits from the Pound's decline -    
                      Minimising cost from import-push inflation/oil dependency 
  Medium-run: Identify problems-break down in supply lines   
  Long-run: Contingency plans for higher cost of financial services and  
                    Outcome depending on final Brexit agreement:   
  1. Soft Brexit: Access to customs union maintained - modest EU market losses 
                       that could be mitigated by the Pound's decline.    
  2. Hard Brexit: A free trade area with EU is put in place. Considerably losses in   
                         EU markets - further declines in the Pound likely   
                         Contingency plans for inflation ranging 4.5 - 5.5%   
  3. Very Hard Brexit: WTO rules are put in place with EU. Considerable losses in    
                          EU markets from tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers - further  
                          declines in the Pound most likely - SMEs to hedge against foreign  
                      exchange exposure - Possible ties with the USA need to be identified 
  Contingency plans for inflation ranging 4.5 - 5.5%/Balance of Payments crisis   
         Lobby to avoid 'cliff-edge'        
 
 
UK Debt - SMEs 
The UK is borrowing money at historically low interest rates since 2011. This could change 
quite considerably post Brexit and in particular in the foreign holders of UK debt view the 
Pound’s decline as a permanent in nature, as a consequence of Brexit. As roughly around 27% 
of the UK’s 1.6 trillion debt (approximately 84% of the UK’s GDP) is owed by non-UK residents 
(approximately 430 £bn), a similar ratio by the BE and the rest by UK residents or UK based 
firms, pensions funds etc., the effects of non-UK residents selling UK debt could be significant. 
Indeed, the increase in inflation, has already caused a decline in bond prices and increased 
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the yield of UK debt (Burton, and Mogi, 2016). At modest rates of inflation, this should not be 
a problem.  
Uncertainty over Brexit negotiations could prompt a continuation on this trend, so that the 
yield could increase further from the current 1.35%. While, this is not likely, in particular, if 
non-UK resident holders of UK debt view the pound' drop as temporary, it should be bore in 
mind by SME’s. Given the complexities in the Brexit process, and unless market’s expect an 
upward trend in the value of the pound in the next 3-5 years, an event which is highly unlikely, 
a declining ratio of foreign-to-domestic holders could cause an increase in the cost of 
borrowing and reduced access to funds. In addition, in this case, the cost of borrowing to firms 
and mortgages could increase substantially, with an adverse impact on economic growth. This 
is not a likely scenario, but one that SMEs need to be aware of. Therefore, SMEs need to 
identify whether a (permanent) depreciation in the value of the Pound to current (or even 
lower levels in the short-to-medium run) and the potential increase in the cost of borrowing 
could be mitigated by the increase in the orders and the volumes of exports that accompany 
such a depreciation (Syed, 2017).  
Whether, the pound’s depreciation would cause a deterioration in its reserve currency status, 
something that could lead to even higher cost of borrowing remains to be seen (Chu, 2017). 
With the USA dollar (63%) and the Euro (20%) accounting for 83% of reserve currency use, 
the Pound (4.5%), and the Japanese Yen (4.5%) as minor  reserve currencies count for another 
9%. The remaining 8% is accounted by the Canadian and Australian dollars, the Swiss franc 
and other currencies. The 4.5% allocation to the Pound corresponds to approximately £280bn 
of reserves held in Pound Sterling (IMF, 2017).     
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4. The case for UK Manufacturing - a Positive Brexit Impact? 
 
Manufacturing in the UK has long been in decline both in absolute and relative terms. A 
variety of factors including de-industrialisation in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, international pricing 
competition from South Asia and East Europe since the early 1990s, automation processes-IT 
innovations and their application in the production process, globalisation and a truly 
international supply chain are among the most important. Membership of the EU since 1973, 
has also contributed by preventing the adoption of a ‘national’ industrial policy that could 
have favoured UK manufacturing. Competing in pricing was thus very difficult even in the 
1970s. This acted against UK manufacturing due to the high cost of production, in relation to 
France and Germany. Later on in the 1980s, the UK government placed more emphasis on 
financial services, as they were viewed more promising in the long-run.  
This led to a declining role for the manufacturing sector, which also suited the political 
objectives of the Thatcher conservative governments, aiming to reduce trade unions powers. 
Manufacturing featured the strongest trade union activity. Many firms that survived the 
1970s and 80s, found it extremely hard to do so in the 1990s due to the downturn in 1991-92 
and new immense pricing pressures from international competitors from Eastern Europe and 
South East Asia. Support from Major and Blair governments could have not been enough. 
Even if New Labour wanted to provide further assistance during 1997 - 2010 this would have 
violated the EU’s Single Market regulations. UK manufacturing firms that survived focused 
more on quality rather than pricing.  
However, the combination of the Great Recession that hit harder the UK, than the USA, France 
and Germany due to the reliance of the UK economy on financial services and the EU 
Referendum outcome would provide barriers to the UK’s financial sector growth. These 
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barriers would emerge due to the emergence on new macroeconomic conditions. The BE in 
its August inflation report, while forecasting the impact of the Referendum on the UK 
economy -acknowledging the difficulties with forecasting in such a fluid environment-, it took 
for granted that Brexit will lead to lower capital mobility (Bank of England, 2016). At present, 
EU governments are not allowed to apply capital restrictions, as this will distort efficiency in 
European capital markets most of which are located in London.- (footnote: Greece is the only 
exception to this rule due to ongoing mitigating circumstances). Brexit will inevitably lead to 
minor capital restrictions between the UK-EU27 capital transactions.  
This does not mean that Brexit will render the UK a close economy, but it does mean some 
distortion in European financial markets, with its nature and magnitude almost impossible to 
anticipate, as it would depend on market’s reaction to the negotiation process and the final 
Brexit agreement. The PM’s Speech also pointed to a hard Brexit. The impact of the new 
conditions (hard Brexit plus lower degree of capital mobility between the UK-EU27) implies 
that capital efficiency would become very difficult to improve, and profits from the financial 
sector could suffer as a result. In addition, the potential loss of passporting rights likely to be 
downgraded to ‘equivalence’ for the UK banks and financial institutions to EU’s Single market 
will render financial services to the rest of the EU more costly, once Brexit is materialised, 
with detrimental effects on the UK financial services (Cox 2017, Finch and Glover 2017). A 
decline in the financial sector’s contribution to the UK’s GDP is likely. This presents 
manufacturing as an obvious candidate based on which the UK economy could/needs to be 
restructured.  
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Why is manufacturing important in post-Brexit Britain? 
The contribution of manufacturing to the UK economic performance is vital, as it accounts 
almost for 10% of the country’s GDP. Further and most important in the context of the UK-EU 
negotiations, it is the leading sector of the economy in terms of exports, accounting for 40-
45% of all UK exports, 58% of which are sold to EU markets. Manufacturing also generates 
the majority, almost 70% of the UK’s R&D. Further, of all sectors of the UK economy is the 
most highly integrated with the rest of EU, in particular in supply chain production (CBI, 2016). 
It is therefore the sector that would be influenced the most by Brexit and the final Brexit 
agreement.   
Overall, six sectors, (Construction, Education, Hospitality, Housing and real estates, 
Manufacturing, Professional and Business Services and Retail) generate almost 3 quarters of 
UK employment. However, a (hard) Brexit will have a different impact on each sector. For 
example, the obvious winner from the Referendum’s Brexit outcome and the Pound’s 
depreciation is Hospitality, Leisure and Tourism. The sector has already benefited from the 
Pound’s depreciation and will most likely continue to do so by potential further depreciations 
once Brexit negotiations commence (BBC, 2017). The sector will only need a fast-Visa Process 
to become available to all tourists from EU-27 countries post Brexit. Other sectors, such as 
Education and Construction will be influenced negatively in the period leading to Brexit, but 
their non-tradable nature implies they do not contribute to the volumes of trade.   
As it can be observed in Table-3, Construction from example, will be influenced from increases 
in the cost of labour, as it could suffer from shortages of less skilled labour. However, the 
sector accounts for only £1.6 and £1.2bn worth of exports and imports respectively. Education 
and Real Estate, while they generate 5 million jobs, are non-tradable. Financial Services is the 
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sector with the highest surpluses generating £54.9bn. The loss of financial institutions 
passporting rights, could cause a significant reduction in these surpluses.  
Table-3: 
The UK economy and different sectors’ contribution 
UK Economy Employees GVA Exports Imports Exports - 
Sector mn bn and % bn bn Imports 
Agriculture 0.476 8.5 18 38.5 -20.5 
Aviation 0.961 52  / 3.4 26   26 
Chemicals and Plastics 0.277 17.5 / 1.1 26.9 27.8 -0.9 
Construction 2.2 102.3 / 6.2 1.6 1.2 0.4 
Creative Industries 1.9 87.4 / 5.3 19.8 8.7 11.1 
Education 2.9 98.1 / 5.9 - - - 
Energy 0.14 36.2 / 2.2 76.7 tn  154.8 tn - 
Financial Services 1.1 119.2/7.2 63.7 8.8 54.9 
Food & Drink 0.444 26 / 1.7 18.2 38.5 -20.3 
Hospitality, Leisure and Tourism 3.1 121.1 / 7.1 22 42.4 -20.4 
Housing and Real Estate 2.1 101.6 / 6.1 - - - 
Life Sciences 0.053 6.4 / 0.4 20.7 19.6 1.1 
Manufacturing  2.7 162.4 / 9.8 228.9 313.3 -84.4 
Professional and Business Services 5.8 204.4/12.3 70.5 40.4 30.1 
Retail 5 182 / 10.9 11.4 6.1 5.3 
Technology 1.2 95.5 / 5.7 20.8 29 -8.2 
Transport, Distrib. and Logistics 1.5 76.8 / 4.6 24.1 21.7 2.4 
Utilities & Environmental Services 0.414 46.9 / 2.8 6.4 4.7 1.7 
TOTAL  32.265   579 600.7   
Table and calculations – author’s own work, data from CBI. Sectors generating more than 2 million 
jobs in bold.  
 
As it can be also observed, Manufacturing accounts for 2.7 million employees, (8.3% of total 
UK employment). Despite therefore of its deficit of £84.4bn, manufacturing remains by far 
the most important exporting sector of the UK economy with £228.9bn worth of exports. To 
make the point clear, the second most export-orientated sector, that of Professional and 
Business Services, generates £70.5bn. And while Professional and Business Services together 
with Retail generate almost 11 million jobs, they generate only £81.9bn worth of exports, less 
than a third than Manufacturing.  
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As 40-45% of all UK exports are manufactured goods and services, and 58% of them are sold 
to EU markets, the sector exports to the EU from £134.3 to 151.1bn. As a result, 
approximately a quarter of all UK exports are manufactured goods and services sold to EU 
markets. Therefore, Brexit, and in particular in the case of a ‘hard’ Brexit, that the PM alluded 
to in her Speech, the UK stands to lose a big proportion of a quarter of its exports on a 
permanent basis. The actual percentage is impossible to estimate, as it would depend on the 
final Brexit agreement. The point to be made, however, is that put simply, the UK government 
cannot ‘ignore’ manufacturing performance.  
As a result, whether the adjustment of the UK’s economy to the new economic environment 
prompted by the EU Referendum outcome and the impeding lengthy Brexit negotiations 
would be smooth, depends largely on the adjustment of the UK’s manufacturing sector to the 
post-Brexit environment, and its responsiveness to the pound’s depreciation in the interim 
period. Further, as already mentioned, the extension of the period that would lead to a 
balanced budget beyond 2020-21, confirmed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the pre-
Budget report, ‘creates’ a new macroeconomic framework that places more emphasis on the 
adjustment of the economy rather than on fiscal consolidation, while acknowledging fiscal 
constraints. Or rather, renders fiscal consolidation contingent to a smooth post-Brexit 
adjustment. Crucial to this is the adjustment of the manufacturing sector to the Brexit 
conditions, given that almost half of the UK’s exports are sold to EU markets.  
 As such, it is the author’s view, that out of all sectors in the UK economy bar Hospitality, 
Leisure and Tourism, Manufacturing stands out as a potential Brexit winner, subject to 
appropriate policies been designed in the short-run and implemented in post-Brexit Britain. 
Certainly, the sector should receive most attention from all UK institutions.  
Manufacturing could emerge as a Brexit winner, as EU membership forbids the adoption of a 
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national industrial policy, viewed as favouritism towards domestic firms and overall distorting 
competition within the EU context. This became a highly contentious issue when the UK 
authorities tried to rescue Tata Steel industry during 2014-16, but EU regulations provided an 
obstacle in doing so. Offering state support for example for a domestic firm, not only puts 
pressure on fiscal policy and public finances by committing tax payers money, but it also 
discriminates against other firms in the EU, and overall reduces European consumers’ surplus. 
The same rationale applies to EU regulations not permitting the Italian government not been 
able to provide a rescue fund on Alitalia etc.  
Brexit is also likely going to reinforce the trend away from sources of direct taxation. Given 
that in the EU context, striking the correct balance between direct and indirect taxation is 
constrained by economic policies pursued by other EU governments, Brexit will ‘free’ the 
hands of UK governments to ‘pursue’ a competitive tax policy (Wishart, 2017). Hence, the 
Chancellors’ comments for potentially lowering corporation tax in the case of an unfavourable 
trade agreement with the EU-27. Accompanying a lower corporation tax, with lower business 
rates and tax incentives for the manufacturing sector will provide a complete set of tax 
policies to accommodate Brexit’s British economy.  
Further, the manufacturing sector’s contribution to the narrowing of the UK’s current account 
deficits would be vital. Given the unprecedented current account deficit exceeded 5% of GDP 
in 2015 and 2016, revenue sources and the fiscal policy mix would also have to be adjusted, 
albeit ensuring a delayed return to a balanced budget (King 2016, Albanese et al. 2017). The 
Bank of England has estimated that the current account deficit will be halved from 5.2% to 
around 2.5-2.6% by 2019, as a result of the Pound’s depreciation (Bank of England, 2016). The 
estimate was based on a 9% depreciation in the value of the Pound. This optimistic forecast 
is based on the nature of the UK’s current account deficits, which while unprecedented is not 
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alarming. This nature points more to a decline in earnings on dividends and interest on foreign 
assets by UK residents during 2011-2015, in relation to payments to foreigners for their UK 
holdings over the same period (Giles and Fray, 2016). As companies that raise their profits 
abroad, in particular in $dollars or Euros, are placed in a very strong position when they 
translate these in pounds (e.g. FTSE 100) the current account deficits are bound to be 
significantly reduced as early as 2017.  
Further, the impact of the depreciation will imply that domestic demand and exports will be 
even more important for future growth, as people in the UK will increase (proportionally) 
their purchase of domestically produced goods and services in relation to imported goods and 
services. As almost half exports are manufactured goods and services manufacturing will have 
to draw the UK government’s attention. In addition, tax revenue sources and the contribution 
from direct and indirect taxation needs to reflect the new reality. Revenue sources have to 
be adjusted in the light of the return to a national industrial policy and significant volatility of 
the Pound-sterling/Euro and Pound-sterling/Dollar exchange rate.  
As these policies were impossible to pursue in the EU context, but are an essential policy 
instrument of any post Brexit government, regardless of political background, new ‘national’ 
sources of finance have to become available. This requires a reshaping of the UK’s 
macroeconomic policy based on government intervention, not previously permitted in the EU 
context. This new type of interventionist policy at a national level (be it Centre-left or Right-
wing in nature), would need to be financed, by direct and indirect taxation. Above all, it 
would/should aim at reducing the productivity gap between the UK and other advanced 
economies including France and Germany. The productivity gap is reflected by the fact that 
the UK recovered its 2008 productivity rates per worker only in the second half of 2015/early 
2016 (Giles and Fray, 2016). UK productivity also lags in relation to France and Germany by 
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20% and 30% respectively, as noted in the Chancellor’s pre-Budget Report (Smith, 2017).  
As a result, UK manufacturing firms should develop a preliminary assessment of the impact 
of:  
 Potential break down in supply chains with production processes located in-part in 
other EU countries, from double-tariffs and quotas; 
 Links between supply chains in manufacturing and financial services located to EU-27. 
This is essential as it could potentially have a detrimental impact on raising funds for 
the manufacturing sector and infrastructure investment. Such links need to be 
reviewed alongside the increased cost of servicing national debt and the Pound-to-
Euro volatility. The former would lead to higher cost of borrowing money for private 
sector firms, the latter would render contracts with European partners based on 
forward exchange rates difficult to agree. As result, convincing European partners to 
renew contracts, or commit to new ones would become a much more difficult process 
than it was in the past. 
 Their responsiveness and impact from the Pound’s depreciation and higher inflation.  
 Adapt and incorporate digital technology in the production process – seek 
government subsidies to build digital capacity and enhance digital training skills.    
 
A UK-national manufacturing policy could/should involve a two-tier system of regional and 
national financial assistance to firms and companies with a strong (or potentially strong) 
exporting capacity. The UK Manufacturing firms in collaboration with the UK authorities 
should: 
1. Identify regional or national leaders (Hutton and Morales, 2017); 
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2. Identify best practices from leaders and try to emulate to other cases; 
3. Improve productivity in the production process by business investment 
programmes, adaptations and staff re-training (to be subsidised by the 
government); 
4. Adopt the best-possible tax incentives (business rates, corporation tax, re-
investment tax breaks etc.);  
5. Seek regional subsidies where possible, with an inclusive approach to Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland; 
6. Prepare a country case study, drawing on the existing arrangements with countries 
that could resemble the UK’s status in relation to the EU, such as Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey etc., and a detailed evaluation of their industrial policies. 
Emphasis would be placed on the rules, regulations and policies that can be 
adopted in the context of the UK economy.  
7. Identify new markets for UK manufacturers, such as the USA-NAFTA, and seek to 
reduce barriers to trade with these as much as possible.  
8. Manufacturing can be used as a tool by the UK government-authorities to reduce 
regional disparities and economic inequalities and performance across the UK.  
9. Review education programmes in the light of the Brexit reality, e.g. adapt higher 
education programmes and unit syllabuses and enhance skill-training programmes 
in colleges and technical education;  
10. Where possible, identify Brexit losers and ways that government policy could 
partly compensate them. For example, the UK automobile industry and its 
adjustment to a ‘hard’ Brexit. 
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Events so far, and a series of impeding elections in EU countries in 2017, including France, the 
Netherlands, Germany and possibly Italy, point to a delayed hard-Brexit, most likely to occur 
at 2020, at the earliest. Therefore, the adjustment of the manufacturing sector in two periods, 
from 2017-Brexit, and then to the post-Brexit period is vital. Existing data on the volumes of 
trade between the UK and the EU should inform policies pre-Brexit that is within the existing 
EU framework subjected to high Pound-to-Euro exchange rate volatility. As such, the 
adjustment of the UK’ manufacturing sector during 2017-Brexit will be dependent on: the 
pound’s depreciation, the extent to which the depreciation would improve the UK’s balance 
of payments deficit and the impact of the pound’s depreciation on the rates of inflation.  
Given that each 1% depreciation in the value of the pound, leads to an increase in exports by 
0.2-0.3 percent, it is expected that the depreciation in the Pound by 16-18 percent, will cause 
an increase in exports by 3.2 - 5.4 percent. This increase in exports would alleviate the current 
account deficit but it would suffice to eliminate it. As a result, the manufacturing sector should 
prepare for a negotiating period featuring high uncertainty and a further pound depreciation. 
Coupled with appropriate post-Brexit policies, the manufacturing sector could play a key role 
in reshaping the UK’s national accounts.   
Ultimately, post-Brexit, the adjustment of the manufacturing sector would depend on 
whether the UK retains access to specific areas in the EU’s Customs Union and industrial 
policies pursued by the UK authorities. These policies should not be subject to political 
developments in the UK. Therefore, the UK government could consider the establishment of 
an across party ‘Institute of national-industrial policy’ alongside existing government 
departments to facilitate the above aims. 
As such, the main policy recommendation for the UK authorities is to focus on attaining the 
best possible trade agreement with the EU-27, and not viewing free trade areas with other 
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countries/regions around the world, as a substitute for UK-EU trade relations. While agreeing 
on the general principles of such trade relations should be very welcome, the UK cannot 
legally bind itself to these, up until it has officially exited EU. This includes the UK-EU new 
trade deal. As such, new trade agreements should be secondary to the new UK - EU trade 
relations. Joining for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (FAFTA), a free 
trade area that includes Mexico, Canada and the USA (Raphael, 2017) will be conducive to 
boosting UK exports to these three countries, but it cannot compensate trade losses from a 
‘bad’ trade agreement with the EU, that would involve WTO tariffs and quotas. Given that as 
mentioned above, a quarter of all UK exports are manufactured goods and services are sold 
to EU markets, the geographical barrier between the UK and the three NAFTA members, is 
going to increase transport costs for UK exports. As the overwhelming majority of UK 
manufactured products are goods (e.g. cars), shipping these to the USA, Canada and Mexico 
is going to increase transport costs quite considerably in relation to shipping these from Hull 
to the Netherlands or Germany.  
The UK could also seek to boost financial services exports to the USA, as in this market 
geographical distance no longer presents the barrier it used to. However, this would be 
subject to fierce competition from USA firms in the same sector. Further, bilateral agreements 
establishing free trade areas, are bound to encounter the exchange rate volatility between 
the Pound and the currencies under perspective, whereas trade with EU, essentially involves 
only the Pound-to-Euro exchange rate, as the rest of the EU currencies are in a fixed exchange 
rate regime with the Euro (e.g. Swedish and Danish Krone, Polish Zloty, Bulgarian Lev etc.).    
To conclude, while the UK negotiates its departure from the EU, it should develop an 
industrial strategy based on four main pillars: 
i. Develop a national industrial policy to be implemented immediately after leaving 
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the EU (if possible the day after!); 
ii. Compensate the loss of trade with the EU-27, the new trade agreement with will 
brought about, by ensuring trade volumes with EU-27 do not decline considerably; 
iii. In order to facilitate (ii), this would imply a considerable depreciation in the value 
of the pound, considerably lower than the current Pound-to-Euro rates, and put in 
place policies described above; 
iv. Develop and join free trade areas/associations with other countries/regions, as a 
means of achieving (ii).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Author would like to express his thanks to Prof Chris Pyke for help with data and 
referencing.  
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